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Abstract
It is shown that the probabilities for the spin singlet can be reproduced
through classical resources, with no communication between the distant
parties, by using merely shared (pseudo-)randomness. If the parties are
conscious beings aware of both the hidden-variables and the random mech-
anism, then one has a conspiracy. If the parties are aware of only the
random variables, they may be induced to believe that they are able to
send instantaneous information to one another. It is also possible to re-
produce the correlations at the price of reducing the detection efficiency.
It is further demonstrated that the same probability decomposition could
be realized through action-at-a-distance, provided it existed.
1 Introduction and Outlook
Entangled states, first considered in Ref. 1, show one of the most challenging
feature of quantum mechanics: unmeasured observables have no value. This fact
manifests in peculiar probability distributions that do not admit embedding in a
master, positive-definite probability that assigns simultaneous values to incom-
patible observables. While this statement applies as well to single particle states,
that do not have in general a positive Wigner function, this feature becomes
particularly interesting when components of an entangled state are separated
in space. Then it is possible to establish the incompatibility between quan-
tum mechanics and not one, but whole families of possible more fundamental
theories, called hidden variable theories, that satisfy some general hypotheses.
This remarkable feat was achieved by Bell,2 who showed that a family of deter-
ministic theories predicts that spin correlators satisfy an inequality, while the
corresponding correlators predicted by quantum mechanical do not. Later the
result was extended to a family of stochastic theories.3 Experimental evidence
excludes these theories,4–10 so that, if a completion of quantum mechanics is to
be found, one must look at theories that violate at least one of the hypotheses
leading to Bell inequality. While locality, intended here as the impossibility
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of action-at-a-distance, is one of these hypotheses, it is not the only one, de-
spite a widespread belief that the present manuscript will prove unfounded. We
are left then with the challenge of finding theories that reproduce the quan-
tum mechanical correlations. In this paper, we concentrate on theories that
violate the hypothesis of Uncorrelated Choice, which establishes the absence of
correlations between the settings of the measuring instrument and the hidden
variables. This violation admits several interpretations: a conspiracy between
the measuring parties, a limitation of their free will, a non-local influence of the
settings on the hidden variable, and also a conspiracy between the particles. We
discuss also how to verify which interpretation is the correct one. In particular,
we propose an (ideal) experiment allowing to decide whether we are in presence
of non-locality or of limited free will, assuming that the hidden variables are
experimentally accessible (if they were not, why bother?). This experiment,
however, cannot rule out a superdeterminist theory, where a cosmic choreogra-
pher has decided from the beginning of times not only how experimentalists will
choose the settings of their apparatuses (or which apparently-to-them random
devices they select), but also all arbitrary conventions assigning meaning to,
e.g., spin up and spin down, etc.∗ Finally, given that the model we propose can
be realized through local classical resources, and that it reproduces the quan-
tum mechanical probabilities, it is to be concluded that quantum correlations
are not exclusively quantum.
After reviewing the typical setup in Section 2, in Section 3 we discuss the
hypotheses at the basis of the derivation of Bell and Leggett-type inequalities,
dispelling some misconceptions about their physical meaning. Section 4 presents
a simpler derivation of Bell inequality, based on a procedure pioneered by Boole
relying only on the hypothesis of counter-factual definiteness. This derivation
actually predates Bell’s, but it was discovered in a mathematical context, where
it was not realized the depth of its implications in physics, until it was rediscov-
ered several years later. Furthermore, we discuss how this alternative derivation
has a great relevance in refuting the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen argument, as it
gives quantitative support to the criticisms of Bohr and others. Section 5 an-
alyzes the Toner and Bacon model,12 showing that it can be obtained as the
limiting case of two different families of models, each violating a different Bell
hypotheses, and also that it can be realized in a natural way through a limitation
of the possible choices of polarization at one station. Section 6 presents a model
by M.J.W. Hall,13 based on minimal correlations between the hidden param-
eters and the choice of polarization. Section 7 introduces a model14 violating
only one of the Bell hypotheses and retaining Malus’s law. It is also discussed
how the model proposed can be explained in various ways — which include
“conspiracy”, limitation of “free will”, exploitation of the detection loophole, or
∗Superdeterminism is unfalsifiable, but I assign it a very small probability of being true. It
is akin to solipsism or intelligent design, in that it can explain anything but predict nothing.
With Schopenhauer (who was talking about solipsism), I would say that superdeterminism
should be treated as a “small frontier fortress. Admittedly the fortress is impregnable, but
the garrison can never sally forth from it, and therefore we can pass it by and leave it in our
rear without danger.”11
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Figure 1: Scheme of the setup considered. Regions A and B are spacelike sepa-
rated. The semicircles represent hypothetical detectors for the hidden variables
as discussed in the Sec. 9.
action-at-a-distance,— depending on what additional hypotheses are made on
the physical nature of the hidden variables. The two models of Section 6 and
Section 7 are combined in Section 8, yielding a model that can violate Cirel’son
bound and reach the maximum violation of Bell inequality. Section 9 discusses
the relation between non-locality and “slave will”, and shows that it is possible
to distinguish between the two, provided the hidden parameters can be mea-
sured, barring superdeterminism. Appendix 10 discusses competing definitions
of locality, and shows with one example that one of them, which is used rou-
tinely in discussions of Bell inequality and that Bell argued coincided with “local
causality”, conflicts with the other ones. Appendix 10 shows how it is possible
to implement the models of Sections 6 and 7 through local classical resources,
with no communication nor shared randomness between the distant parties, by
only having shared randomness between each party and the entangler.
2 The system
The setup considered (see Fig. 1) consists of two particles produced in a region
C of the spacetime, each travelling to a different detection region, A and B.
The measurement of each particle does not need to happen at the same time,
but the two detection events are assumed to have spacelike separation, so that
a reference frame exists in which the measurements are simultaneous. The
outcomes of the two measurements are two-valued, and will be denoted by
eA = σ = ±1 and eB = τ = ±1. The A (B) detector is characterized by
a unit vector nA = a (nB = b), corresponding to the orientation of a spin
measuring device in Quantum Mechanics. The quantity of interest is the joint
probability P (σ, τ |Ψ,Σ) with Ψ describing the preparation of a singlet state,
and Σ = {a,b} specifying the observables being measured. Since Ψ appears as
a prior in all the probabilities considered, it is omitted for brevity. We shall
write for brevity P (σ, τ |Ψ,Σ) = Pσ,τ (Σ). A hidden variable theory consists in
assuming the existence of additional parameters, λ, providing a finer description
of the state of the system, so that, according to Bayes’s rule
Pσ,τ (Σ) =
∫
dµ(λ|Σ)Pσ,τ (λ,Σ), (1)
3
where µ(λ|Σ) = µλ(Σ) is the probability distribution for the additional pa-
rameters under the experimental conditions Σ = {a,b}. The joint probability
Pσ,τ (λ,Σ) can be further decomposed in either of two ways:
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b) = M
A
σ (λ,a,b)Q
B
τ (λ,b,a, σ) = M
B
τ (λ,b,a)Q
A
σ (λ,a,b, τ), (2)
with the marginal probabilities
MAσ (λ,a,b) ≡
∑
τ
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b), (3a)
MBτ (λ,b,a) ≡
∑
σ
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b), (3b)
and the conditional probabilities
QAσ (λ,a,b, τ) ≡
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b)
MBτ (λ,b,a)
, (4a)
QBτ (λ,b,a, σ) ≡
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b)
MAσ (λ,a,b)
. (4b)
For models respecting the symmetry between A and B, if B measured along
a and A along b the new probabilities should coincide with the former ones,
i.e., MAσ (λ,a,b) = M
B
σ (λ,a,b) and Q
A
σ (λ,a,b, τ) = Q
B
σ (λ,a,b, τ), so that the
upper index can be dropped since the functions coincide. There are models,
however, where this symmetry is lost at the hidden variables level, see, e.g.,
the Toner and Bacon model discussed below. In the following, we shall write
the hidden variables as λ = λA ∪ λB ∪ λG, where λj (j ∈ {A,B}) refers to
the local parameters, i.e. to the variables that can be associated, at the time
of detection, to the regions A and B (they can be parameters locally attached
to the particles and parameters describing the detection regions) and λG refers
to the global parameters, i.e., parameters that it is not possible to pin down
to a region of space-time, as the wavefunction of an entangled system. Bell15
used the term “beables” to refer to local parameters, and assumed that there
are no global parameters, presumably motivated by classical mechanics, where
the local parameters are dynamical quantities describing physical systems, and
no global parameters are needed if all the local ones are known with infinite
precision.
3 Hypotheses at the basis of Bell and Leggett
inequalities
3.1 Bell inequality
Events corresponding to the detection of one particle, e.g., the determination
of the spin projection of an electron along a given direction, can be reproduced
easily by a hidden-variable model satisfying some reasonable requirements.2
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However, when one considers a system composed of two entangled particles, re-
producing the predictions of quantum mechanics becomes a non-trivial matter.
Refs. 2 and 16 demonstrated that a family of deterministic and local models is
incompatible with quantum mechanics, and the experiments4–10 have corrobo-
rated this statement by reproducing the quantum mechanical predictions with
remarkable accuracy. Refs. 2 and 16 discriminated between quantum mechanics
and the said special class of deterministic local hidden-variable theories through
inequalities, known as Bell and CHSH inequalities. The CHSH inequality, in
particular, proves to be easier to check against experimental data, and it is
currently written in a different form than in the original paper16 as
|C(a,b) + C(a′,b) + C(a,b′)− C(a′,b′)| ≤ 2, (5)
with C the correlator (assuming σ = τ = 0)
C(a,b) =
∑
σ,τ
στPσ,τ (a,b). (6)
Under the hypothesis of determinism, the marginal probabilities areMAσ (λ,a,b) ∈
{0, 1} and MBτ (λ,b,a) ∈ {0, 1}. Then there is a discontinuous function S (re-
spectively, T ) such that σ0 = S(λ,a,b) (respectively, τ0 = T (λ,b,a)) is the
only permitted value of σ (resp., τ). Hence, the conditional probabilities are
QAσ (λ,a,b, τ0) =Q
A
σ (λ,a,b, T (λ,b,a)) = M
A
σ (λ,a,b), (7a)
QBτ (λ,b,a, σ0) =Q
B
τ (λ,b,a, S(λ,a,b)) = M
B
τ (λ,b,a). (7b)
Since the marginals are
MAσ (λ,a,b) =
∑
τ
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b) = Pσ,τ0(λ,a,b) = M
B
τ0(λ,b,a)Q
A
σ (λ,a,b, τ0)
(8a)
MBτ (λ,b,a) =
∑
σ
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b) = Pσ0,τ (λ,a,b) = M
A
σ0(λ,b,a)Q
B
τ (λ,b,a, σ0),
(8b)
we have that for deterministic theories
QAσ (λ,a,b, τ0) =M
A
σ (λ,a,b), (9a)
QBτ (λ,b,a, σ0) =M
B
τ (λ,b,a). (9b)
For σ 6= S(λ,a,b) or τ 6= T (λ,b,a), the conditional probabilities take the
indeterminate form 00 . In any case, the joint probability, conditioned on λ,
factorizes as
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b) = M
A
σ (λ,a,b)M
B
τ (λ,b,a) (10)
and the marginals are
MAσ (λ,a,b) = δσ,S(λ,a,b) , M
B
τ (λ,b,a) = δτ,T (λ,b,a) (11)
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Bell2 then requires that the marginal probabilities obey the hypothesis of
Setting Independence,
MAσ (λ,a,b) =M
A
σ (λ,a) (12a)
MBτ (λ,b,a) =M
B
τ (λ,b) . (12b)
For deterministic theories, Eqs. (12) are equivalent to S(λ,a,b) = S(λ,a),
T (λ,b,a) = T (λ,b). This hypothesis derives from the hypothesis of locality,
meant as the impossibility of action-at-a-distance. Setting Independence is actu-
ally weaker than locality: let us imagine that the parameters λ can be divided
into localized parameters associated to the particle reaching A, λA, localized
parameters associated to the particle reaching B, λB , and global parameters
λG that cannot be associated to a particle. Setting Independence allows the
marginal probability at A to depend on the remote local parameters λB , even
though it forbids dependence on the remote parameter b.
Finally, it is required that
µ(λ|a,b) = µ(λ). (13)
This hypothesis is sometimes called Measurement Independence, but we prefer
to call it Uncorrelated Choice, meaning that the choice of the settings is un-
correlated to the value of λ. The original justification of Uncorrelated Choice
relied on locality: if one imagines the λ as a deterministic time-evolution of λ0,
parameters localized at the entangler when the particles are emitted, changing
the settings can not influence λ0 and hence it cannot influence λ. However,
this picture was revealed17 to be inexact, since a correlation between two events
coinciding in space-time does not imply necessarily a causal relation between
them, and even when there is such a causal relation, which event is the cause
and which the effect is merely metaphysical (at least for time-symmetric physical
theories such as classical and quantum mechanics). Indeed, by having µ(λ|a,b)
we can think that the λ influence the choice of the settings, rather than vice
versa. Locality implies not Eq. (13), but only that
µA(λA|λG,a,b) =
∫
ΩB
dλBµ(λA, λB , λG|a,b)∫
ΩA
dλA
∫
ΩB
dλBµ(λA, λB , λG|a,b) = µ
A(λA|λG,a) (14)
and
µB(λB |λG,b,a) =
∫
ΩA
dλAµ(λA, λB , λG|a,b)∫
ΩA
dλA
∫
ΩB
dλBµ(λA, λB , λG|a,b) = µ
B(λB |λG,b), (15)
where Ωj is the domain of λj . Thus the hypothesis of Uncorrelated Choice is
stronger than locality.
In summary, the original derivation of Bell and CHSH inequalities relied on
Determinism, which implies Eqs. (10) and (11), Setting Independence, which
implies Eq. (12), and on Uncorrelated Choice, which requires Eq. (13). Since
6
Setting Independence and Uncorrelated Choice were believed to follow from lo-
cality, the inequalities, which are violated by quantum mechanics, were said to
establish an incompatibility between local realistic theories and quantum me-
chanics. The term “realism” was used by Bell as synonymous with determinism.
Later on, this statement was corrected to the incompatibility between quantum
mechanics and all local deterministic theories allowing complete “free will”, i.e.
satisfying Uncorrelated Choice.
While Eq. (11) was used in the original derivations of Refs. 2 and 16, later it
was realized3,18 that it was unnecessary, so that the probabilities were allowed
to take values in the whole range [0, 1]. However, it was essential for deriving
the inequalities, that Eq. (10), another consequence of determinism, still held.
Confusingly, Eq. (10) was instead considered a consequence of locality, perhaps
because it was implicitly assumed that the hidden variables consisted only of
local parameters. It was then claimed that an incompatibility existed between
all stochastic, local hidden-variable models and quantum mechanics. Ref. 19
pointed out, however, that Eq. (9) is not implied by locality, which, we remind
the readers, means the impossibility of action-at-a-distance. Hence Eq. (9)
or equivalently Eq. (10) has to be postulated for stochastic models. Ref. 19
called such hypothesis “completeness”, while Ref. 20 coined the name “Outcome
Independence”. On the other hand, Bell15 postulated “Outcome Independence”
as the definition of “local causality”. Appendix 10 shows with an example that
Bell’s definition is untenable, if one accepts that there are global parameters.
We shall refer to Eq. (10) as Reducibility of Correlations, since it means
that the knowledge of λ breaks down the correlations between σ and τ , so that
correlations are reducible to ignorance of λ. Reducibility of Correlations implies
that
QAσ (λ,a,b, τ) =
{
MAσ (λ,a,b) ,∀τ : MBτ (λ,b,a) 6= 0
0
0 ,∀τ : MBτ (λ,b,a) = 0
, (16a)
QBτ (λ,b,a, σ) =
{
MBτ (λ,b,a) ,∀σ : MAσ (λ,a,b) 6= 0
0
0 ,∀σ : MAσ (λ,a,b) = 0
. (16b)
These equations characterize Outcome Independence, and they in turn imply
Reducibility of Correlations. Hence the two terms are interchangeable.∗
In conclusion, Bell-type inequalities establish an incompatibility between
quantum mechanics and a special class of stochastic models, the ones satisfy-
ing the hypotheses of Reducibility of Correlations, Setting Independence, and
Uncorrelated Choice. While Ref. 19 and subsequent papers20–23 highlighted the
fact that Reducibility of Correlations is not a consequence of locality, these con-
tributions were forgotten in the 90s, when the word “locality” in the context of
Bell inequalities was redefined to mean compliance with the three hypotheses
∗Strictly speaking, if one interprets the symbol 0
0
as having a meaning of its own, then the
term “Outcome Independence” does not describe properly Eqs. (16). However, one could as
well say that since the symbol 0
0
is indeterminate, one may assign to it an arbitrary value,
0
0
= MAσ (λ,a,b) and
0
0
= MBτ (λ,b,a).
7
Reducibility of Correlations, Setting Independence, and Uncorrelated Choice.
This, I seem to understand, was due to the erroneous belief that the three hy-
potheses are implied by and imply the impossibility of action-at-a-distance. To
make the situation worse, this special usage of “locality” has variances: some au-
thors refer to Setting Independence as the no-signaling hypothesis (erroneously,
since if B can change the local parameters λB , a message can be instanta-
neously sent to A), and to Reducibility of Correlations as a consequence of
“locality”; other authors refer to both Setting Independence and Reducibility
of Correlations as “locality” conditions, others still take locality as synonymous
with no-signaling. Throughout this paper we use locality as the impossibility of
action-at-a-distance (see Appendix 10).
3.2 Leggett inequality
Ref. 24 considered a class of hidden-variable models which obey Uncorrelated
Choice, as expressed by Eq. (13), and do not necessarily satisfy Reducibility
of Correlations, but which obey an analogue of Malus’s law for the hidden
variables, which consist in two unit vectors, λ = {u,v}:
MAσ (λ,a,b) =(1 + σu · a)/2, (17a)
MBτ (λ,b,a) =(1 + τv · b)/2. (17b)
It was shown24–26 that these models predicts a correlator satisfying an inequal-
ity known as Leggett inequality, which is violated by quantum mechanics and by
experiments.25,27–32 It is unfortunately confusing that the new Leggett inequal-
ity was presented as an incompatibility theorem between quantum mechanics
and a class of non-local models. Indeed, models satisfying Eqs. (17) satisfy lo-
cality, if one thinks of u and v as parameters attached to each particle, while,
as we discussed above, models satisfying Setting Independence in general do
not. In this sense, Bell inequalities rule out also some non-local models, while
Leggett inequality does not, contrary to what is claimed. The source of the
misunderstanding is the following: in order to justify the correlation
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b) 6= MAσ (λ,a,b)MBτ (λ,b,a), (18)
Ref. 24 assumed the existence of further variables λ′, in terms of which
Pσ,τ (λ,a,b) =
∫
dµ(λ′|λ)Pσ,τ (λ, λ′,a,b), (19)
where the joint conditional probability is assumed to factorize as
Pσ,τ (λ, λ
′,a,b) = δσ,S(λ,λ′,a,b)δτ,T (λ,λ′,b,a). (20)
These models are non-local, since they violate Setting Independence, and deter-
ministic. Leggett coined the term “crypto-non-local” theories to refer to them.
Yet, it was realized that these models are only a special case of non-local mod-
els,33 and that it is irrelevant that λ′ exist or not, given that Eqs. (13) and (17)
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imply Leggett inequality, independently of how they are arrived to.26,34 Fur-
thermore, one could say as well that the violation of Bell inequality rules out all
the crypto-non-local theories such that upon integration of λ′ Eqs. (10), (12),
and (13) hold. Thus, the importance of Leggett inequality consists not in the
fact that it discriminates between quantum mechanics and non-local theories,
but in that it does not require Reducibility of Correlations, just Uncorrelated
Choice and a more specific form of Setting Independence.
3.3 Models reproducing the quantum predictions
Examples that the violation of Uncorrelated Choice could lead to reproducing
the quantum mechanical prediction were provided in Ref. 13,35. These models
do not satisfy Malus’s law. The amount of violation of Uncorrelated Choice nec-
essary to reproduce quantum mechanics was recently quantified.13,36 In Section
7, we discuss a model of ours14 that satisfies at the same time the hypotheses of
Malus’s law (and hence Setting Independence) and Reducibility of Correlations,
but violates Uncorrelated Choice. In the literature there are also models vio-
lating both Uncorrelated Choice and Reducibility of Correlations,25,37,38 only
Setting Independence,12,39 or only Reducibility of Correlations.40
Clearly, by violating one of the hypotheses at the basis of Bell and Leggett in-
equalities it may be possible to violate them. Reproducing quantum mechanics,
however, is not guaranteed, since the violation of Bell and Leggett inequalities
is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
4 Alternative derivation of Bell inequalities
More than a hundred years before Bell derived the famous inequality, Boole41 de-
fined what he called ‘conditions of possible experience’: He imposed that the ob-
served probabilities of k events Ej1 , Ej2 , · · ·Ejk selected from a set {E1, · · ·En}
were the marginals of a master probability P (E1, · · ·En). This led to inequalities
of the form
R∑
r=1
Arpr ≤ A0 (21)
where R is the number of different subsets of events for which there are exper-
imental data, while pr is the corresponding probability, and Ar are properly
chosen coefficients. It is possible to derive Bell-type inequalities from Boole
inequalities, as was done in various papers predating Bell’s,42–45 where Boole’s
inequalities were rediscovered independently. These papers, however, were con-
cerned with mathematical and computational problems, and their authors were
not aware of the implications of the results in physics. As an example, the
9
CHSH inequality can be derived in a few lines:
|C(a,b) + C(a′,b) + C(a,b′)− C(a′,b′)|
=
∣∣∣∣∑
σ,σ′
τ,τ ′
(στ + σ′τ + στ ′ − σ′τ ′)Pσ,τ,σ′,τ ′(a,b,a′,b′)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
σ,σ′
τ,τ ′
|στ + σ′τ + στ ′ − σ′τ ′|Pσ,τ,σ′,τ ′(a,b,a′,b′)
≤
∑
σ,σ′
τ,τ ′
(|σ + σ′|+ |σ − σ′|)Pσ,τ,σ′,τ ′(a,b,a′,b′) = 2. (22)
The beauty of this alternative route to Bell-type inequalities consists in that it
does not rely on the existence of hidden variables and requires only one hypoth-
esis, the ‘condition of possible experience’, or, in current terminology, counter-
factual definiteness: spin components along any direction have a well defined
probability distribution, independently of which component is being measured.
This is but the definition of ‘elements of reality’ given in the paper by Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen.1 While it is dubious that the three hypotheses that Bell
formulated in his derivation of the inequality and the very concept of hidden
variables correspond to the hypotheses made in the EPR paper, counter-factual
definiteness, instead, is certainly among the latter ones. Thus, the Boole-style’s
derivation of the Bell-type inequalities, and the experimental violation of these,
proves the EPR assumption of ‘elements of reality’ fallacious. This was indeed
understood immediately, albeit in a qualitative way, in many responses46–51 to
the EPR paper, of which Bohr’s48 is the most famous, but perhaps not the most
clear.
I conclude this section acknowledging Refs. 52 and 53 that brought to the
attention of the physics community the pioneering results of Boole and those of
Bass, Schell, and Vorob’ev, respectively. Furthermore, the Boole-style derivation
of the inequalities was rediscovered independently in Refs. 54 and 55. Finally,
Ref. 56 proved that the observed frequencies of experiments (the frequency of
observing, e.g., an outcome σ times the frequency with which the detector is
chosen along a direction a) always admit a master probability distribution, i.e.,
they are Kolmogovorian in the terminology of Ref. 56). This shows quantita-
tively that superdeterminism can never be ruled out.
5 The Toner and Bacon model
In order to show an example of the interchangeability between non-locality and
limited free will, let us consider the Toner and Bacon model,12 which relies
on a station sending a bit of information c to the other one, presumably by
instantaneous communication, otherwise one could not violate Bell inequality
in real time without keeping the locality loophole open. The model works in the
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following way: both A and B can access two unit-vector hidden-variables u,v,
which have a uniform distribution µu,v = 1/(4pi)
2 independent of the settings.
The outcome of A is deterministic, its marginal probability being
MAσ (a,u,v) = δσ,S(λ,a) (23)
with S(λ,a) = sgn(u·a), and the sign function sgn(x) = −1, x < 0 and sgn(x) =
+1, x > 0. The conditional probability at B is
QBτ (b,u,v,a, σ) =
{
0
0 , if σ = −S(λ,a)
δτ,T (λ,a,b) , if σ = S(λ,a)
(24)
where the indeterminate form 00 reflects the fact that the priors u,a, σ are
incompatible, T (λ,a,b) = −sgn[(u+c(λ,a)v) ·b], c(λ,a) = sgn(u ·a) sgn(v ·a).
5.1 Two possible extensions of the Toner and Bacon model.
Let us lift the hypothesis of determinism so that, instead of Eq. (23), we have
MAσ (a,u,v) = p δσ,S(λ,a) + (1− p)δσ,−S(λ,a), (25)
where 0 < p < 1 is a fixed probability. There is an ambiguity about how to
interpret the bit c. The latter, indeed, can be seen either as a function of u,v,a,
or, equivalently, as c = c˜(v,a, σ) = σsgn(v · a). Then Eq. (24) becomes either
QBτ (b,u,v,a, σ) = δτ,T (λ,a,b) , (26a)
if we choose c = c(λ,a), or
QBτ (b,u,v,a, σ) = δτ,T˜ (λ,a,b,σ), (26b)
with T˜ (λ,a,b, σ) = −sgn[(u + c˜(v,a, σ)v) · b], if we choose c = c˜(v,a, σ). We
have thus two families of hidden variable models, depending on a parameter
p. In the first family, the conditional probability does not depend on σ, and it
coincides with the marginal probability, which, hence, depends on a, violating
Setting Independence. After integrating out u,v, the probability is
Pσ,τ (a,b) =
1
4
[1− (2p− 1)στa · b] . (27a)
In the second family, we have that Reducibility of Correlations is violated, in-
stead, while the marginal probability at station A satisfies Setting Independence.
Since the Toner and Bacon model has the (unaesthetic, in my opinion) feature
of being asymmetric, if we instead consider the marginal probability at B and
the conditional probability at A, we arrive to
MBτ (b,u,v,a) = pδτ,T˜ (λ,a,b,S(u,a)) + (1− p)δτ,T˜ (λ,a,b,−S(u,a)),
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and
QAσ (a,u,v,b, τ) =
p δσ,S(λ,a)δτ,T˜ (λ,a,b,S(u,a)) + (1− p)δσ,−S(λ,a)δτ,T˜ (λ,a,b,−S(u,a))
MBτ (b,u,v,a)
,
so that both Setting Independence and Reducibility of Correlations are violated
by the second family in this alternative factorization. However, for asymmet-
ric models, we propose to say that Setting Independence is violated when it is
not satisfied in either of the two possible factorizations of the joint probabil-
ity, Pσ,τ (λ,a,b) = M
A
σ (λ,a,b)Q
B
τ (λ,b,a, σ) = Q
A
σ (λ,a,b, τ)M
B
τ (λ,b,a). (If
Reducibility of Correlations is satisfied in one factorization, it is also in the al-
ternative one.) Therefore, in this second case, Setting Independence is satisfied.
The resulting average probability is
Pσ,τ (a,b) =
1
4
[1− pστa · b] . (27b)
Both Eq. (27a) and (27b) reproduce the quantum mechanical probability for
p→ 1, and both families of models tend to the Toner and Bacon model in this
limit: the first family violates Setting Independence and preserves Reducibil-
ity of Correlations, the second family does the opposite. In a sense, models
not complying with the Reducibility of Correlations are more robust, since they
deviate from the quantum mechanical probability less than the models not com-
plying with Setting Independence (correlations are reduced by p instead than
by 2p− 1).
5.2 Local realization through limited free will
Finally, let us show that the Toner and Bacon model admits a simple reinter-
pretation in terms of limited free will. We assume that c is not a bit generated
by A, but a binary hidden-variable, in addition to two unit vectors u,v, which
are distributed uniformly.
When A receives u,v, c, the setting will be chosen so that c = c(u,v,a)
holds. We may imagine that σ = S(u, a) is enforced by some appropriate local
physical law. Analogously, B chooses an orientation b, but freely, while the
physical laws on his side determine that τ = T (u,v, c,b) = S(−u − cv,b).
Hence, the hidden variables are, in this reformulation, λ = {u,v, c}, and they
are distributed according to
µ′u,v,c(a,b) =
1
(4pi)2
δc,c(u,v,a). (28)
The marginal probability at A is still
MAσ (u,v, c,a) = δσ,S(u,a) (29)
while the conditional probability at B is
QBτ (b,u,v,a, σ) =
{
0
0 , if σ = −S(u,a)
δτ,T ′(λ,b) , if σ = S(u,a)
(30)
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with T ′(λ,b) = −sgn[(u + cv) · b], so that both Setting Independence and
Reducibility of Correlations are satisfied.
6 Hall model
Ref. 13 proposes a different decomposition of the quantum mechanical prob-
ability, through a model which has the maximum “free will” compatible with
quantum mechanics, and deterministic outcomes:
µ(u,v|a,b) = δ(u+ v) 1− f(u,v,a,b)
8 arccos f(u,v,a,b)
, (31)
where
f(u,v,a,b) = sgn(u · a)sgn(v · b) a · b, (32)
and sgn(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0, sgn(x) = −1 for x < 0. The probability of the
outcomes, given u,v, is
Pσ,τ (u,v,a,b) = δσ,sgn(u·a)δτ,sgn(v·b), (33)
so that both Setting Independence and Reducibility of Correlations are satisfied.
We notice that if u,v are considered local parameters, localized, respectively, at
the particle reaching A and the one reaching B, the model is non-local, because
of the tangled nature of the function f . Indeed, the marginal distribution for u
is
µA(u|a,b) = 1− f(u,−u,a,b)
8 arccos f(u,−u,a,b) , (34)
and clearly depends on b. Thus, the two vectors are to be considered global
parameters, if one wants to interpret Eq. (31) as limiting the “free will” of the
observers who choose a,b but preserving locality. Assuming that the uncon-
ditional probabilities are uniformly distributed, by using Bayes’s theorem one
finds the conditional probability of having setting a,b for given u,
Π(a,b|u) = 1− f(u,−u,a,b)
32pi arccos f(u,−u,a,b) . (35)
Thus not only the settings are not free, but they are also correlated. In Appendix
10, we show how to realize this probability distribution by using two additional
global unit vectors zA, zB , in terms of which the distribution is
µ′(u,v, zA, zB |a,b) = δ(u+v)δ(a−zA)δ(b−zB) 1− f(u,v, zA, zB)
8 arccos f(u,v, zA, zB)
. (36)
Then if u,v are interpreted as local parameters the marginal distribution be-
comes
µA(u|zA, zB ,a,b) = 1− f(u,−u, zA, zB)
8 arccos f(u,−u, zA, zB) , (37)
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for a = zA, b = zB , and is undeterminate in the other cases. The hypothesis of
locality is satisfied by this trivial introduction of additional global parameters.
We notice that it is important to distinguish the variables from the values they
take. The δ function in Eq. (36) force the value of a to equal the value of zA,
etc., but a and zA are distinct variables.
7 A simple model reproducing the quantum me-
chanical probabilities for the spin singlet
Here we present a simple model reproducing the quantum mechanical probabil-
ity for a spin-singlet. The model satisfies at the same time the hypotheses of Set-
ting Independence, Reducibility of Correlations, and Compliance with Malus’s
law, while it violates the hypothesis of Uncorrelated Choice. This model was
derived already in 2007, but it remained unpublished until recently,14 when I
came to realize that despite its simplicity it has several appealing features. In
the basic formulation, the hidden-variables consist in two unit vectors u,v, lo-
calized at the left- and right-going particle, respectively (see Fig. 1). As one
would expect for a state with zero total spin, the vectors are perfectly anti-
correlated u = u0,v = −u0 (an index is used for the values, while the random
variables are indicated by letters with no index). Furthermore, the distribution
of u and v is tied to the polarization settings a,b according to
µu=u0,v=v0(a,b) =
1
4
δ(u0 + v0)
× [δ(a− u0) + δ(a+ u0) + δ(b− v0) + δ(b+ v0)] . (38)
The marginal probability of a particle with u = u0 giving an output σ when
impinging on a detector with polarization a is given by Malus’s law (which is
local: no action-at-a-distance is needed)
MAσ (u,a) =
1
2
[1 + σu · a] . (39)
At the hidden variable level, the particles are uncorrelated, i.e. the two vectors
u,v specify all needed information, so that the conditional probability coincides
with the marginal one,
QBτ (v,b,a, σ) = M
B
τ (v,b) =
1
2
[1 + τv · b] . (40)
After integration over u0,v0 the quantum mechanical probability for the singlet
is recovered
Pσ,τ (a,b) =
1
4
[1− στa · b] . (41)
Equations (39) an (40) are classical, i.e., they can be realized through classical
resources. By demonstrating that Eq. (38) can be realized through classical
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resources as well, the main result of this paper will be achieved: so-called quan-
tum correlations are not exclusively quantum, since they can be mimicked by
classical means. We remark that the interpretation of Eq. (38), or of any math-
ematical expression for probabilities, relies on a metaphysical assumption, the
one about cause and effect. As will be discussed in Section 9, by interchang-
ing cause and effect what was attributed to lack of “free will” is attributed to
non-local action-at-a-distance, and vice versa.
7.1 Local realization through one bit of shared random-
ness between the measuring stations
Let us discuss how to realize Eq. (38) assuming u,v to be the cause, and a,b
the effect. The two parties A and B possess identical pseudo-random∗ number
generators, each producing the same binary number c ∈ {0, 1}. Furthermore,
by making a local measurement, they can determine, respectively, u and v (see
Fig. 1) without perturbing the system. When c = 0, A will measure u, then
flip a coin, and according to the outcome d of the flip (or at whim), will orient
the polarizer either in direction u0 or −u0, obtaining the outcome σ = +1 in
the first case, σ = −1 in the second case. B, on the other hand, shall choose b
freely (for instance at random) when c = 0. In the other case c = 1, A and B
will reverse their actions, i.e. A shall choose a freely, while B chooses b = v0
or b = −v0 according to the flipping of a coin (or at whim). Given that the
conservation law u + v = 0 holds, Eq. (38) is obtained after summing over c
and d, which do not appear in the conditional probability Pσ,τ (u,v,a,b) the
distribution that we have just described
µλ0(a,b) =
1
8
δ(u0 + v0)δ
(
c0(a− d(A)0 u0) + c0(b− d(B)0 v0)
)
, (42)
with c ∈ {0, 1}, c = 1 − c, and d ∈ {Heads, Tails} = {−1, 1}.† Some authors
may refer to the bit c as “non-local information”, but this is evidently just a
verbal trick, since no instantaneous communication is going on, nor there is any
action-at-a-distance.
It is interesting to compare two different proposed measures of “free will” in
relation to this model. According to Ref. 13, putting λ = {u,v, c, d}
M = sup
∑
c,d
∫
dudv |µλ(a,b)− µλ(a′,b′)| = 2. (43)
This is the maximum value of M and corresponds to the absence of “free
will”. However, since in our model half of the times A or B is free to choose
the setting, while B or A, respectively, has still a binary choice, M does
∗By making use of classical resources, the only known way to produce two identical numbers
at spacelike separated locations is to rely on a pseudo-random algorithm using an identical
seed.
†Eq. (38) may also be realized in an asymmetric way, e.g., having A to always orient the
polarizer along ±u.
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not quantify sufficiently well the concept of “free will”. The mutual infor-
mation proposed in Ref. 36, gives instead I(a,b : u,v, c, d) = ∞. How-
ever, if we discretize the allowed polarizations, having them take N possi-
ble values, we get I(a,b : u,v, c, d) = log2(N), half of the maximum value
Imax(a,b : u,v, c, d) = 2 log2(N), which represents total absence of free will.
This measure is hence a better quantifier of “free will”.
7.2 Local realization exploiting the detection loophole.
As pointed in Ref. 36, there is a close relation between the violation of Uncorre-
lated Choice and the detection loophole (which consists in the fact that not all
pairs of particles impinging on the detectors successfully give rise to coincidence
counts). This was explored in Ref. 57 to violate a Bell inequality (with only
two possible settings for each detector). Indeed, an alternative explanation of
the probability of the former subsection is that each particle carries with it a
bit cA (resp., cB) and a unit vector u (resp., v), where the variables are anti-
correlated cA + cB = 1 (modulo 2), u + v = 0. The particles are programmed
to act according to the following set of instructions: If cA = 0, particle A shall
behave according to Malus’s law, giving an output σ with the probability given
in Eq. (17a). If cA = 1, particle A will give no output unless the direction a
coincides (let us say within some tolerance, so that we can avoid continuous
distributions) with ±u. Particle B acts in a corresponding way. If one is inter-
ested only in violating a Bell inequality, one needs two settings for a and two
for b, so that one may limit u to take eight possible values, and obtain this way
an efficiency of 25% (i.e. 75% of times only one detector will give an output).
Also, if one makes the model asymmetric, having, e.g., always cA = 0, then the
detection efficiency drops only to 50%, as in Ref. 57. However, if a,b have an
uncertainty ∆Ω and they are spanned throughout the unit sphere, the protocol
illustrated here reduces the efficiency to ∆Ω/2pi.
7.3 Local realization of the model through shared ran-
domness between each station and the entangler
There is no need to have shared randomness between A and B, but only between
each station and the entangler. This is illustrated at length in Appendix 10.
7.4 Non-local realization through action-at-a-distance
Let us show, now, that inverting the cause-effect relationship between a,b and
λ, the model proposed can be explained alternatively by non-local action at a
distance. Indeed, Eq. (38), This could be interpreted as having, e.g., a to force
the value u0 = a and v0 = −a when c0 = 0 and d(A)0 = 1. Since v is assumed to
be a local parameter describing the particle at station B, we have an instance
of action-at-a-distance: the setting at one station influences the parameter at
the remote station.
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a' b'
Figure 2: A possible configuration allowing E = 4 for the probability of Eq. (44).
8 A model violating Cirel’son bound.
We show that it is possible to violate the Cirel’son bound, which establishes
the maximum violation of Bell inequality that quantum mechanics can achieve
(2
√
2, when the Bell limit is 2). All we need to do is to mix the two models of
Refs. 13 and 14: The distribution of the hidden variables is given by Eq. (38)
and the λ-conditioned probability is not given by Malus’s law, but by Eq. (33).
This gives the joint probability
Pσ,τ (a,b) =
1
4
[1− στsgn(a · b)] . (44)
The correlator is thus
C(a,b) = −sgn(a · b), (45)
and the Clauser-Horne parameter E = |C(a,b) +C(a′,b) +C(a,b′)−C(a′,b′)|
reaches the value 4 for infinitely many choices of the orientations, one of which
is given in Fig. 2. This model can be realized with local classical resources along
the lines of the previous section.
9 How to discriminate among “slave will”, “non-
locality”, and “conspiracy”
The alternative realizations of the same model presented in Section 7 show
that a probabilistic theory has several possible interpretations depending on the
metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of its objects ad events. Let us see
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how one could decide in favor of one interpretation over the other. On one hand,
the realization through the detection loophole can be falsified by making sure the
detector’s efficiency exceeds 50%. The realization through limited free will may
be discerned from the one through action-at-a-distance in the following way: Let
us assume that A and B can measure the parameters u,v (if the parameters
are not experimentally accessible or controllable, there is no point in assuming
they exist) during the flight of the particles, before detecting σ, τ . After several
runs, A will realize that half of the times u is directed along a or −a, and
that if she changes a, u will change accordingly. Since the conservation law
guarantees that v = −u, A, assuming she has free will, will conclude that she is
acting instantaneously on the remote parameter. Then she will agree with B the
following instantaneous signaling protocol: they both limit their choices to four
possible directions, ±a, ±b, e.g., orthogonal to each other. A fixes her setting
to a and B to b, then A measures u and B measures v. If A measures u = a,
she will quickly switch her apparatus either to b, making sure that v = −b
so that B will measure with certainty τ = −1 (which they agree to correspond
to the bit 0), or to −b, making sure that v = b so that B will measure with
certainty τ = +1 (which they agree to correspond to the bit 1). The half of the
times when u = ±b, A will do nothing (B knows that this is a fail, because he
will see v = ∓b before measuring τ). This way, A can send to B an arbitrary
sequence of bits. Now, if A is actually acting with free will and there is an
action-at-a-distance, then this sequence of bits will correspond to a significant
message, and will have a low entropy. If instead A has no free will, but it is the
value of u that determined the setting a, this sequence of bits will be totally
random. Of course there is always the possibility of superdeterminism, where
the same mechanism that determines a,b is also responsible for the thousand
of years of evolution of the languages, and of the recent conventional encoding
of their symbols in sequences of bits. This hypothesis is clearly unfalsifiable, i.e.
we cannot set its probability of being true to exactly zero, but I believe that
given our experience of the world and our scientific knowledge its probability
must be extremely low.
We notice that the slave will model cannot be tested unless one is able to
measure or fix the additional parameters. For instance, Ref. 58 tests the free will
hypothesis, but only for stochastic theories, and concedes that what is called
therein “deterministic local realism” cannot be falsified. Indeed, it may happen
that the random number generators and the hidden variables are correlated,
but that any correlations and regularities disappear upon integrating out the
hidden parameters. This would give the illusion of having two independent
random number generators at the quantum level, while the randomness is lifted,
or limited, at the subquantum level. Thus, for a given model that violates
Uncorrelated Choice, discriminating between slave will and non-locality requires
the ability to either control or detect the hidden parameters.
Finally, the realization of Section 7.1 can be interpreted indifferently as stem-
ming from a conspiracy or from a limitation of free will. Which is the case can
be decided by making sure that neither A nor B can decide a,b based on a
measurement of u,v. For instance, one could ask A and B to provide before-
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hand a list of the settings they will be using in each repetition. The procedure
is opposite to the one followed to close the locality loophole: the settings are
decided well in advance of the production of the entangled pairs, and they are
kept fixed. If one observes A and B switching their apparatuses to settings not
agreed upon, but coinciding with ±u, then one can conclude that either their
free will is limited or that the previous decision of the sequence a,b influenced
the future distribution of u,v at the entangler. At the same time, the latter
hypothesis can be ruled out by having a third party to switch their apparatuses
at the last moment.
10 Conclusions and Perspectives
Quantum correlations can be obtained by local classical resources, provided the
choice of setting is correlated to the hidden variables through shared randomness
or alleged action-at-a-distance. If an external observer has no access to the
hidden variables, he or she can be induced to believe that genuine quantum
correlations are being observed. Classical resources, however, can only provide
shared pseudo-randomness, so that an infinitely intelligent observer may, in
principle, discover the underlying algorithm, even without access to the hidden
variables. ∗ On the other hand, if the external observer can measure the
latter ones, he or she can discriminate if the correlations between the hidden
parameters and the settings are due to a conspiracy, a lack of free will, or an
action-at-a-distance.
Dropping the hypothesis of Uncorrelated Choice, however, is not the only
way to reproduce the quantum mechanical correlations. One may relax the
hypothesis of Setting Independence, instead, as in Ref. 12, where the correlations
are simulated by having one party to transmit an information c to the other one.
We have shown that this model has a natural corresponding model satisfying
Setting Independence and violating Uncorrelated Choice, if one sees c as an
additional hidden variable.
A third possibility consists in relaxing the hypothesis of Reducibility of Cor-
relations.40 I believe this last alternative leads to models as counter-intuitive
as quantum mechanics, since they violate the classical reductionist assumption
that the whole is the sum of its parts and that correlations are an expression of
ignorance.
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Definitions of locality It is commonly encountered the statement that the
violation of Bell inequalities implies that reality is non-local. As far as I know,
locality can have any of the following meanings
a. Impossibility of instantaneous action-at-a-distance (no action-at-a-distance,
NAD).
b. Impossibility of instantaneous communication between two space-like sepa-
rated parties (no-signaling, NS).
c. Impossibility for a body to have an arbitrary velocity (no faster-than-light
speed, NFL).
These three formulations are non-equivalent, and one should specify which one
is intended when using the term “locality”. For instance, the violation of (c)
certainly implies the violation of (a) and (b), but the vice versa is not true; the
violation of (b) implies the violation of (a), e.g., one could send a set of instruc-
tions to a far-away robot, that would execute some action accordingly; I surmise
that it is possible to violate (a), without violating (b), even though I cannot
provide presently a satisfactory example. Hence, the chain of implications holds:
NAD =⇒ NS =⇒ NFL. We shall use the stricter definition of locality, NAD.
We notice that there is a problem in defining what is an “action” for a stochastic
theory, thus we propose a suitable extension of this concept. First, we need to
distinguish between local parameters, that Bell termed “beables”, and global
ones. Local parameters are attached to points in space-time, and give rise to
events when they are measured in a single shot. Global parameters describe a
preparation procedure, and cannot be associated with the particles composing
the system. A measurement gives a collection of events {ej} each corresponding
to a different point of space-time. We say that a model is local (NAD) if the
marginal probability of observing an event eA at a space-time point A depends
on global variables and only on those local parameters at the space-time point
(xA, tA).
There is a fourth definition of non-locality referring specifically to a the-
ory predicting events ej observed by local detectors Σj at space-like separated
regions Rj given that a system is specified by some parameters λ,
d. A theory is local if the probability of observing the events ej factorizes as
P ({e}|λ,Σ) =
∏
j
P (ej |λ,Σj) (46)
In the special case of a bipartite entangled two-level system, we have that Σj
represent (pseudo)spin components, and ej = ±1 in appropriate units. We
want to show that if one takes Eq. (46) as the definition of locality then models
which are patently local according to any of the definitions (a)-(c) are classified
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as non-local according to (d). Let us first rewrite the left hand side of Eq. (46)
by applying repeatedly Bayes’s theorem
P ({e}|λ,Σ) =
∏
j
P (ej |Ej , λ,Σ), (47)
where E1 = ∅ is the empty set, and Ej = {e1, e2, . . . , ej−1}. Eq. (47) is a
mathematical identity following from the rules of probability theory, and does
not involve any physical assumption. Now, let us consider the first factor in the
right hand side of Eq. (47), P (e1|λ,Σ). If we invoke locality (NAD) as defined
above, we have the physical equality P (e1|λ,Σ) = P (e1|λG, λ1,Σ1). The second
factor, however, is P (e2|e1, λ,Σ). Invoking again (NAD), we have that the
marginal probability is P (e2|λ,Σ) = P (e2|λG, λ2,Σ2). However, nothing can be
said about the conditional probability P (e2|e1, λ,Σ). Analogously, we have in
general that
P (ej |Ej , λ,Σ) = P (ej |Ej , λ,Σ1, . . . ,Σj). (48)
Thus, by applying (NAD) we cannot justify Eq. (46). In other words, condition
(d) is stronger than (NAD). This was pointed out by Jarrett.19 In order to
obtain the equality in Eq. (46) we have to make a further hypothesis, which
Jarrett referred to as completeness,19 and Shimony as outcome-independence.20
This hypothesis is simply that
P (ej |Ej , λ,Σ1, . . . ,Σj) = P (ej |λ,Σ1, . . . ,Σj), (49)
i.e., the conditional probability of observing ej given that e1, . . . , ej−1 were
observed is identical to the marginal probability of observing ej . Bell
15 tried to
argue that a seemingly plausible definition of “local causality” implied Eq. (49),
but his proposal was criticized.17
Now, while in order to establish P (ej |Ej , λ,Σ1, . . . ,Σj) it is necessary that
observers in R1, . . . , Rj−1 communicate their results to the observer in Rj , the
marginal P (ej |λ,Σ1, . . . ,Σj) can be determined by means of a local measure-
ment in Rj , without need for communication. Then, assuming that Outcome
Independence holds, it is now possible to invoke once again (NAD) and obtain
finally
P (ej |Ej , λ,Σ1, . . . ,Σj) = P (ej |λ,Σj), (50)
which, upon substitution in the right hand side of Eq. (47) yields Eq. (46). So
far, we have basically reformulated the conclusions of Ref. 19, that, however, is
not widely known to physicists.
Let us establish sufficient conditions for the validity of Outcome Indepen-
dence as formulated in Eq. (9). Determinism is a sufficient condition: if the
knowledge of λ determines the outcome of the measurements Σj , all other in-
formation is redundant. Another sufficient hypothesis is that of probabilistic
determinism, which is not an oxymoron, but means that knowledge of the
λ determines the probability of the outcome, not the outcome itself. Per-
haps this concept coincides with what Jarrett19 calls “completeness”, which
we avoid since it is a term laden with subjective meanings. Another sufficient
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condition is separability:21 the parameters λ =
⋃
j λj , where λj are parame-
ters attached to the particle number j and represent prepossessed values. In
other words, there are no global parameters. Then we have that the probabil-
ity of any outcome ej can be determined by knowledge of the λj alone, i.e.,
P (ej |Ej , λ,Σ1, . . . ,Σj) = P (ej |λj ,Σj), which is a special form of Outcome In-
dependence. Bell, in particular, assumed15 that all hidden parameters where
of the local type (the “beables”), and that global parameters were an expres-
sion of ignorance of “beables”, and could thus be eliminated. Finally, it can be
proved59 that if a model satisfies factorability then there is a natural extension
of this model which is deterministic.
In order to show the absurdity of identifiying Eq. (46) with locality, we shall
provide now a simple model which is manifestly local, but would be classified as
non-local according to (d). Let us consider the following experiment: a dealer
prepares two decks of cards which can be a King (K) or a Queen (Q), and
Black (B) or Red (R); each deck is subdivided into pairs, such that each pair is
formed by a King and a Queen, and a Black and a Red card. In the first deck
(D1), 30% of the pairs are (KR,QB), and 70% (KB,QR). In the second deck
(D2), 70% of the pairs are (KR,QB), and 30% (KB,QR). The dealer chooses
a deck at random, with equal probability, then extracts a pair out of the deck,
and handles one card each to two observers, one, A, sitting to his left and the
other, B, to his right. In this model, the hidden variable λ is the deck which
has been chosen. Once the pair is extracted from the deck, λ is not localized
on either card, but is a global parameter, which cannot be reconstructed by
observers A and B by making local observations (even if they compare their
results). The only way to determine λ would be to check which deck was chosen
at the location of the preparation. Now let us consider the joint probability
that A will receive a King and B will receive a black card given that deck 1 was
chosen:
P (K,B|λ = D1) = 3
20
, (51)
since a pair with a red King and a black Queen will be extracted with probability
3/10, and the black Queen is received by R half of the times. On the other hand,
if factorability holds, we should have
P (K,B|D1) = P (K|D1)P (B|D1) = 1
4
. (52)
Thus, according to definition (d), the model we have presented is non-local.
Notice that, elaborating further our example (or with any example which we
can make out with our classical imagination), it is not possible to violate Bell
inequality. The reason lies in the fact that in any classical case the hypothesis
of counter-factual definiteness is always satisfied. The peculiarity of reality
revealed by the experimental violation of Bell inequalities consists in the fact
that no such complete characterization of a system exists in principle.
Realization of the model of Section 7 through entangler-detectors shared
randomness Here we present a further realization of the model of Section 7,
without having any shared randomness between A and B, but only between
22
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Figure 3: Scheme of the setup.
each station and the entangler. Let us consider the following setup depicted in
Fig. 3: there is a sophisticated baseball pitching machine able to pitch two balls
spinning with angular velocities ω and −ω (with ω fixed) in opposite directions.
The balls are approximatedly a rigid body and have spherical symmetry. They
are pitched with fixed center-of-mass velocities in a vacuum (so that the spin
does not influence the center-of-mass trajectory through the Magnus effect)
such that their centers of mass follow given trajectories each ending in a bat
controlled by an independent system. Each bat is carefully crafted to be a solid
of revolution, its center of mass is being held fixed, and a machine varies the
orientation n of the bat’s symmetry axis. It is empirically found that a ball
pitched with ω = ωu, after hitting a bat whose axis is oriented along n, will fall
in the foul ground with a frequency (1 − n · u)/2, and in the fair ground with
the complementary frequency (1 +n ·u)/2. Due to our politically incorrect bias
against negative numbers, we shall associate the value σ = −1 to the event of
the ball being batted in the foul ground, and σ = +1 to the alternative event.
The pitching machine varies the spin of the two balls according to the following
algorithm: it flips a fair coin, and according to the result, heads H = A or tails
T = B, it consults either of two internal watches, WA and WB . Each watch
is built so that the small hand has a period τj,s and the large hand τj,l, with
j ∈ {A,B}. Unlike what happens in ordinary watches, any two of the four
periods are mutually incommensurable. The positions of the hands are used
to determine a unit vector zj . This may happen in a straightforward fashion,
as depicted in Fig. 4 or by using a Montecarlo algorithm, so that an external
observer could not predict what spin is chosen, even knowing the periods of the
watches. The machine will then pitch a ball spinning along u = zj to the left,
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Figure 4: A unit vector is associated with the hands of a watch.
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and one spinning along v = −zj to the right, or viceversa, according to another
coin flip, with outcome d ∈ {H,T} = {1,−1}.
The batting machine to the right possesses a watch W ′H , and the one to the
left a watch W ′T , which have the same periods as the watches of the pitching
machine, and are synchronized with them. Each batting machine is using the
same algorithm as the pitching machine to determine the value of zj , but it is
subtracting from the input values tj,h the number ∆t (mod τj,h), where ∆t is the
time-of-flight of the ball. The batting machines will orient the bats along a = zA
and b = zB , respectively. We remind that the probability of the outcome σ for
a ball spinning in the direction u and hitting a bat oriented along n is
Mσ(u,n) =
1
2
[1 + σn · u] . (53)
It is easy to check that the expected joint frequency of observing the outcomes
σ, τ to the left and to the right when the respective bats have orientations a,b
is
Pσ,τ (a,b) =
∫
dudv µ(u,v|a,b)Mσ(u,a)Mτ (v,b)
=
1
4
[1− στa · b] , (54)
with the density
µ(u,v, zA, zB |a,b) = 1
4
δ(u+ v)δ(zA − a)δ(zB − b)
∑
j,d
δ(u− d zj) (55)
We notice that the batting machines are devoid of “free will”, since the di-
rections a,b are determined, while the pitching machine has two binary choices,
first in choosing either watch, then in choosing which ball to pitch towards, e.g.,
left.
It is immediate to realize that the model of Ref. 13 can be reproduced by
changing the algorithm used by the pitching machine. Now the pitching machine
will use both watches WH ,WT to determine two unit vectors a,b. The pitcher is
in possession of a third watch W0, whose hands determine a unit vector u. The
third watch, however, is not ticking regularly, but it is coupled to the watches
WR and WL in such a way that the hands correspond to the vector u, for given
a,b, with the frequency
Π(u|a,b) = 1− f(u,−u,a,b)
8 arccos f(u,−u,a,b) . (56)
The pitcher will then proceed to pitch two balls, the first, spinning about u, to
the left, and the second, spinning about −u, to the right. The other parameters
of the procedure ω, v are readjusted such that a ball spinning around u hitting
a bat oriented along n will give the outcome σ with probability
Pσ(u,n) = δσ,sgn(u·n). (57)
The batters, on the other hand, keep using the former algorithm in order to
determine a,b.
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